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Abstract 
 This paper addresses the controversial issue of Turkish women 
wearing the (türban), which is now before the Turkish Constitutional 
Court. Almost simultaneously, the governing AKP party, which won the 
2007 election, has been indicted on the grounds of engaging in anti-
secularist activities, including the promotion of the türban as a political 
symbol of Islam in democratic politics in Turkey.  This paper analyzes 
data from the 2007 Turkish Election Survey to determine to what extent 
Turks perceive the türban as an issue of religious freedom of the pious 
women or a political symbol of an Islamic movement, and perceive it as 
a high priority issue. The paper also examines the role that the türban 
played in determining voting behaviour in an election won by the AKP, 
all of whose leaders have wives who wear the türban. The paper 
concludes with an assessment of how far this potent symbol of Sunni 
religiosity influences democracy in Turkish society. 
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the ISA 2009 Annual Conference at New 
York, NY during February 14 -17, 2009. The author would like to 
acknowledge Sabanci and Isik Universities, Nuffield Foundation, the Open 
Society Institute at Istanbul and the Halle Center of Emory University.for 
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to the field survey conducted during June 23 and July 16, 2007. The data for 
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goes without saying that the analysis conducted in the paper is the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
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 The attire of women, in particular the style of donning of the 
headscarves to cover the head, neck, ears, and the shoulders of women 
(türban) by pious Sunni women has once again become the center of 
controversy in Turkish higher education and politics soon after the 
general elections of July 22, 2007. In fact, hicab (or tesettür as it is more 
commonly referred to in Turkey) and the türban have become persistent 
valence issues in Turkish higher education and politics since the early 
1980s. Therefore, at the spur of the moment any such matter may crop 
up in Turkish politics. When a Turkish High Court or the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) hears a certain case pertaining to the 
türban, the media and press coverage of the court case becomes 
imminent in Turkey. It is also quite natural to expect a political debate to 
emerge over whether türban donning is no more than an exercise of the 
freedom of conscience or of a religious right, or a violation of the dress 
codes of the universities and an attempt at eroding the secularist 
principles of the Republic.  
However, when asked right before the general elections of July 22, 
2007 what constituted the most important problem facing Turkey, 99.9 
percent of the voters seemed to mention economic woes, increasing 
threat of terror, and social welfare related matters and concerns. 
 
Unemployment     35.4  
Terror/National Security    21.4 
Inflation          8.3 
Economic Instability      7.2 
Education         6.2 
Personal – Family Related Problems   5.3 
Health, Social Welfare          3.3 
Housing, Environment, etc.       2.7 
Political Instability          2.4 
Corruption, Bribery        2.1 
Southeast / Kurdish Problem    2.0 
Crime          1.7 
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When further probed as to what constituted the political campaign 
issues aired and debated by the political parties in June and July 2007 a 
huge majority indicated that it was the economy or terror that captured 
their attention the most, while only 0.4 percent of the respondents 
mentioned the türban (see Table 1). Finally, the press reported that the 
then deputy Prime Minister M. Ali Şahin argued that the türban was the 
concern of 1.5% of the population prior to the July 22, 2007 general 
elections,1 and that they would be safe to ignore that issue throughout 
their election campaign. In the election manifesto of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) neither the türban nor any other issue 
pertaining to hicab appeared.2 Under the circumstances, there were 
hardly any expectations that the türban would capture the headlines in 
the aftermath of the national elections of 2007. To the amazement of 
many pundits and students of Turkish politics by October 2007 Turkey 
was again in the grips of another türban debate, which soon climaxed 
into a crisis.   
 A declaration by the Prime Minister (PM) Recep T. Erdoğan in 
Spain precipitated the process that led to the tabling of a motion by the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in the Grand National Assembly 
(TBMM) to amend the article 10 of the Constitution. Article 10 was on 
the equality of the citizens before the law, which the AKP considered as 
less than adequate to help the türban donning students to attend the 
universities unhindered. Negotiations between the MHP and AKP 
resulted in tabling an amendment that also included article 42 of the 
Constitution, which pertained to the right of the Turkish citizens to 
higher education. The MHP had been arguing for a long time that the 
türban issue was specifically exploited by the AKP to mobilize support at 
the polls. Therefore, the MHP, by tabling an amendment of the 
Constitution, wanted the upper hand among the Sunni Muslim and 
conservative voters in Turkey by making its image that of the party that 
“solves  the  türban  issue.” The  amendments  were  aimed  at  rendering  
                                                
1 See www.haber7.com/haber.php?haber_id=255141.  
2 See www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname.pdf and also for its coverage in the media at the 
time of the election campaign of July 22 2007 general elections see 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20070624/AKP-secim-beyannamesini-acikladi.php. 
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Table 1: WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE DISCUSSED IN 
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN PERIOD OF JULY 22, 2007 GENERAL 
ELECTIONS? (OPEN ENDED QUESTION) 
Campaign Issue Frequency Percent 
Unemployment 273 13.5 
Terror 237 11.7 
Presidency 137 6.8 
Party Propaganda / Ascending to Power 133 6.6 
Gasoline Price Cut  85 4.2 
Economy (Unspecified) 84 4.2 
Empty Promises 61 3.0 
University Entrance Exam / Education 52 2.6 
Formation of the New Government 38 1.9 
Agriculture / Farming 38 1.9 
Inflation 33 1.6 
Laicism 17 0.8 
Democracy 11 0.5 
Türban 9 0.4 
Other domestic and local issues 167 8.3 
Don’t Know / No Response 643 31.9 
Total 2018 100.0 
Source: Pre – election national survey of 2007. 
 
unconstitutional the denial of enrollment in the institutions of higher 
education on the grounds of attire brandished by the students, without 
making any references to laïcité (laiklik), the broader issue of secularism. 
However, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as the party of 
secularism in Turkey, appealed to the Constitutional Court and 
challenged the constitutionality of these amendments. The CHP argued 
that the new versions of article 10 and 42 were a breach of the secular 
principles of the Republic, and thus violated article 2 of the Constitution, 
which can neither be amended, nor can there be any motion to amend it 
in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM).  
 Although the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) could only 
consider a constitutional amendment by reference to its procedural 
correctness (form), and could not examine the substance of the 
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amendments of the Constitution made by the TBMM,3 in a historical 
decision the Court concurred with the CHP and declared the 
amendments as violations of article 2 of the Constitution. Almost 
simultaneously, the AKP, which won the most votes and seats in the 
National Assembly after the July 22, 2007 elections and formed the 
government, was also charged with becoming the focal point of activities 
against secularism by the Public Prosecutor of the Republic. The Public 
Prosecutor requested the TCC to ban the AKP as well as 71 of its 
members, including the Prime Minister, from all forms of political 
activity. The Public Prosecutor’s indictment made lavish use of the 
arguments of the AKP frontbench that promoted the the türban in 
universities. Indeed, the TCC also decided that the AKP constituted a 
focal point of activities against laiklik, though did not go so far as to ban 
the party, but imposed a minor financial punishment by banning the 
party from getting funds out of the state budget for 2008, which seemed 
not to perturb the financial capabilities of the AKP much. Once again the 
türban emerged to capture the headlines and determine the political 
fortunes of politicians and major political parties in Turkish politics.  
 In this paper, I will present data collected between June 23 and July 
16, 2007 in a nationally representative survey of voter attitudes, beliefs, 
values and reported behavior, and determine to what extent the adult 
population in Turkey perceives the türban as a religious right of the 
pious women and also as a symbol of religious freedom. Some studies 
have so far been conducted by Arat,4 Carkoğlu,5 Göle,6 Kalaycıoğlu,7 
                                                
3 The article 148 of the 1982 Constitution states that “… The Constitutional Court 
shall examine the constitutionality, in respect of both form and substance, of laws, 
decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly. Constitutional amendments shall be examined and verified 
only with regard to their form…”. 
4 Yeşim Arat, Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics, 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), Yeşim Arat,  “Feminists, 
Islamists and Political Change in Turkey”, Political Psychology, vol. 19, no. 1, (March 
1998): pp. 117 - 131, Yeşim Arat, “One Ban and Many Headscarves: Islamist Women 
and Democracy in Turkey”, Hagar: International Social Science Review, vol.2, (1), 2001: 
47 - 60. 
5 Ali Çarkoğlu,"Religiosity, support for şeriat and eveluations of secularist public 
policies in Turkey", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.2, (April 2004): pp. 111-136. 
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Özdalga,8 Pusch,9 and Toprak10 to examine the role of türban in Turkish 
politics and society, but none so far on the role that attitudes toward the 
türban play in the decisions of the voters at the polls. I will examine the 
role the türban played in determining the party preferences of the voters 
at the polls on July 22, 2007, and thus contributed to the election victory 
of the AKP, all of the leaders of which have wives who don the türban.  
 
I. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TÜRBAN ISSUE 
 Türban has become the perennial valence issue in Turkish politics, 
which has fuelled emotional clashes between the government and 
opposition parties, the TCC and the TBMM, and between the editorial 
columnists of different dailies, magazines, journals, and the media since 
the early 1980s. In the recent years field research started to systematically 
probe into the attitudes of the voters toward the türban. In three national 
surveys conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2006 of the voting-age population 
in Turkey conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu11 it was 
found that about two-thirds or more of voters say that women should be 
free to don the türban in the university campuses, and also as state 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey”, 
in Augustus R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, (Leiden and New York: 
1996): pp. 17-43. 
7 Ersin Kalaycioglu, “The Mystery of the Türban: Participation or Revolt?” Turkish 
Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2005): pp. 233-251. 
8 Elisabeth Özdalga, “Civil Society and Its Enemies”, in Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune 
Persson (eds.) Civil Society, Democracy, and the Muslim World, (Istanbul: Swedish 
Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997): pp. 73-84. 
9 Barbara Pusch, “Stepping into the Public Sphere: The Rise of Islamist and Religious-
Conservative Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations in Stefanos Yerasimos, et. 
al. (eds.) Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in 
Contemporary Turkey, (Istanbul: Ergon, 2000): pp. 475-505. 
10 Binnaz Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey” in Augustus Richard Norton (ed.) Civil 
Society in the Middle East. (Leiden, New York, Koln, E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 87-118. 
11 Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, 
Participation and Stability in an Islamic Society, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007): passim 
reports the findings of the 2002 and 2003 election and political participation national 
surveys and defines the sampling procedure. For the sampling procedure used in the 
2006 national survey of attitudes, values, beliefs and opinions in Turkey see Ersin 
Kalaycioglu, “Politics of Conservatism in Turkey” Turkish Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, (June 
2007): pp. 233-252.  
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employees in the public institutions in Turkey.  Although the vast 
majority of the voting age population does not consider the freedom of 
women in covering themselves up and donning the türban as one of the 
important problems facing the country, nonetheless again a two-thirds 
majority of the public seem to be of the opinion that this is a practice that 
should be left to the women, who should be permitted to wear whatever 
they please, wherever they please. In the 2007 pre-election survey,12 
when the same issue is probed a similar set of responses have been given 
(see Table 2), which indicate that we are faced with stable attitudes 
toward the issue in question.  
 
Table 2: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TÜRBAN 
Question: Do you approve of women state officials wearing turbans covering 
their head, hair and shoulders in their workplace? 
            2006 Survey      2007 Survey 
  Percent 
No, they should not wear the turban  
 in their workplace      33.6     30.7 
Yes, they should be allowed to wear 
  turban in their workplace     65.1     67.5 
Don’t Know/ No Response       1.3       1.7 
Total       100.0   100.0 
Sample Size     1846   2018 
 
Question: How about university students?  Should they be allowed to wear 
turban in universities? 
No, they should not wear turban 
  in universities       31.2     28.5 
Yes, they should be allowed to wear 
  turban in universities      67.1     69.7 
Don’t Know/ No Response       1.0       1.8 
Total       100.0   100.0 
Sample Size     1846   2018 
Sources: Nationwide survey conducted by Ali Carkoglu - Ersin 
Kalaycioglu, 2006 and the pre – election national survey of 2007. 
 
                                                
12 See the Appendix of this paper for how the survey sampling was carried out. 
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Table 3: RELIGIOUS PRESSURE AND TÜRBAN 
Q. Can people properly worship in Turkey?  
Yes   No 
  %    % 
63.3  33.8  (2002) 
68.5  27.1  (2003) 
74.2     22.5  (2006) 
80.5  17.5  (2007) 
Change 17.2          -16.3 
 
Q. Are religious people under pressure in Turkey? 
Yes   No 
  %   % 
40.0  55.6  (2002) 
33.7  62.5  (2003) 
25.7     69.9    (2006) 
27.4  70.0  (2007) 
Change      -12.6  14.4 
 
Types of Pressure (Asked to those who answered the previous question 
as “yes”):      2002      2003      2006 2007 
              %           %          %    % 
Firm resistance to “Türban-Headscarves” 67.7       74.4       68.8 77.7 
Lack of freedom of worship                       7.3        16.0        1.7   2.5 
Status of the Đmam-Hatip High Schools       4.6          2.6         1.7    -- 
Oppression in Schools        --         --   --   3.1 
Banning prayer in Government Offices     --            --          5.3   4.5 
Banning Kur’an Courses            --            --          3.6   2.9 
Sources: Results of the Political Participation Study October 2002 and 
the Panel group of February 2003; survey on socio-political attitudes and 
political choices in Turkey by Ali Carkoglu - Ersin Kalaycioglu in 2006, 
and of the pre – election national survey of 2007.  
 
When a series of separate questions are asked on whether people 
can worship freely in Turkey about 80 percent of the electorate seemed 
to concur in 2007, which increased from 63 percent in 2003 (see Table 3). 
When the rest of the electorate who believed that the religious people 
(believers) are under some form of pressure in Turkey are probed, they 
have been systematically registering the ban on donning the türban by 
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the university students, employees, and state and public employees as 
the most notorious practice of pressure on religious people in the 
country (see Table 3). The other responses are so small in terms of 
percentages that if somehow the türban issue is resolved in Turkey to the 
satisfaction of the majority, no other practice may be singled out by any 
sizable proportion of the population as an example of pressure on the 
religious believers. 
 This picture seems to indicate that the so called “türban ban” is 
perceived as an issue of freedom of expression by most voters, for only a 
small minority seems to consider it as pressure on the believers. Most 
voters seem to be of the opinion that the way women dress in Turkey is 
not an exclusively religious, but a folkloric or traditional matter, which 
pertains to habits, mores, and customs of the land, which often varies 
through communities and localities across the land. It seems as if most 
people do not to consider the türban as a political symbol of the the 
Islamist Movement (Islamcılık Cereyanı), though some politicians of 
various parties and the spokespersons of that Movement may think 
otherwise.   
 When a more strong yearning for a religious practice, such as the 
attitudes toward the re-establishment of the Sharia (Şer’i) law and a 
theocratic state are probed, we tend to get a similar picture. A small and 
diminishing proportion of the electorate seem to yearn for a state under 
Sharia rule in Turkey (see Table 4). 
However, this time those who favor a theocratic rule in Turkey 
seem to be much smaller in size. It seems as if they have diminished over 
the years from about more than one fourth of the population in 1996 to 
about one tenth of it in 2007 (see Table 4).  Although there is a correlation 
between attitudes toward the Sharia state and the attitudes toward 
considering the ban on the türban as a form of religious pressure on the 
believers, (Cramer’s V = 0.094, significant at 0.95 level of significance), it 
also buttresses the earlier findings that the attitudes toward the türban 
are not just a demand of political Islamists in Turkey. We need a more 
thorough and sophisticated empirical analysis of the sources of the 
attitudes toward the türban in Turkish society. In the following I will 
focus  on  the  connection   between   religiosity,   political   Islam,   socio- 
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Table 4: ŞERĐAT BASED RULE IN TURKEY 
      Yes       No   No Response  
        %     %           % 
2007      11.7  82.6           5.7 
2006            9.1  76.5         14.4 
2003       15.4  75.6           9.0 
2002         16.4  74.1              9.5 
2001      21.0  67.9         11.1 
1998            19.8  59.9         20.2 
1996      26.7  58.1         15.2 
1995      19.9  61.8         18.4 
Sources: 2007: Pre-election survey.  2006: Survey on socio-political 
attitudes by Ali Carkoglu - Ersin Kalaycioglu. 2003: “Political 
Participation Panel Study”, conducted by Ustun Erguder, Ali Carkoglu, 
Ersin Kalaycioglu. 2001: Results of the survey conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu 
and Binnaz Toprak and sponsored by TESEV. 1995, 1998:  Results 
reported in surveys conducted by TÜSES. 
 
economic status, overall conservatism and political ideology and 
attitudes toward türban in Turkey. 
 
II. DETERMINING THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE TÜRBAN IN 
TURKEY 
 Preceding sections of this paper have reported findings on wearing 
the türban by state employed women in the offices of the state agencies 
and by female students in the university campuses – both of which are 
considered as acts violating the secular principles of the Republican by 
the high Courts in Turkey. It has also reported findings concerning the 
depiction of the policies of the state on the türban as a form of pressure 
on the devout Muslims. Therefore, we have two different sets of 
attitudes toward the türban as dependent variables. The former pertains 
to the legitimacy of the türban issue, and the latter to the türban as a 
symbol of religious discrimination.    
 
III. MEASURES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TÜRBAN 
Attitudes toward the legitimacy of the türban issue are reported in 
Table 2. The legitimacy of the türban is operationalized through 
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assigning “1” to those who registered a favorable opinion to wearing the 
türban by students on Turkish university campuses and “0” to those who 
register the opposite unfavorable opinion to the same question. The 
second dependent variable on the legitimacy of the türban is 
operationalized through assigning “1” to those who registered a 
favorable opinion to donning of the türban by the state employees at 
work and “0” to those who register the opposite unfavorable opinion to 
the same question. 
 The attitudes toward the türban as a symbol of religious 
discrimination are presented in the preceding Table 3 of this paper. As a 
measure of türban as a symbol of religious discrimination, I propose the 
following measure: Those who indicate the türban as the sign of pressure 
on devout Muslims are assigned the value of “1” and the rest of the 
sample are assigned the value of “0”.  
 
IV.INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 Drawing on earlier research on the topic13 gender, religiosity, 
urban versus rural residence of the respondent, socio-economic status of 
the individuals, formal education, and associational membership are 
incorporated. Religiosity is measured through a factor analysis of several 
questions about attitudes toward religion, state, and reported practices 
of worship (see Table 5).  The factor solution presented below is used to 
calculate  the   corresponding   factor   scores   per   respondent   and   per  
 
                                                
13 Ali Çarkoğlu,"Religiosity, support for şeriat and eveluations of secularist public 
policies in Turkey", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.2, April 2004, 111-136. Nilüfer 
Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey”, in 
Augustus R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, (Leiden and New York: 
1996): 17-43. Ersin Kalaycioglu, “The Mystery of the Türban: Participation or 
Revolt?” Turkish Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2005): pp. 233-251. Elisabeth Özdalga, 
“Civil Society and Its Enemies”, in Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (eds.) Civil 
Society, Democracy, and the Muslim World, (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in 
Istanbul, 1997): pp. 73-84. 
13 Barbara Pusch, “Stepping into the Public Sphere: The Rise of Islamist and 
Religious-Conservative Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations in Stefanos 
Yerasimos, et. al. (eds.) Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political 
Culture in Contemporary Turkey, (Istanbul: Ergon, 2000): pp. 475-505. 
  
13 
Table 5: RELIGIOSITY IN TURKEY (FACTOR SCORES) (2007) 
Items        Component 
       Religious Belief  Political Islam 
(faith) 
Picture of the Mescid-i Aksa at home  .804   .004 
Picture of the Kabe at home    .763   -.100 
Picture of Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi 
   at home       .667   .049 
Do you desire the establishment of a state 
  that is based upon the Sharia in Turkey? .073   .353 
Self reported Religious identity   .083   .550 
Do you consider yourself religious,  
  irrespective of how frequently you worhip? -.123   .677 
Participation in public prayer and worship -.204   .741 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
           Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.   
Source: Pre – election national survey of 2007. 
 
dimension of religiosity as reported below (see Table 5). Both measures 
of religiosity are linearly independent of each other.  
 The type of residence of respondents at the time of the interview 
were also incorporated in the study, whereby those residing in a village 
were assigned the value of 1, small towns 2, cities the value of 3, 
provincial centers  4, and metropolitan areas  5. Women respondents are 
assigned the value of 0 and men are assigned 1. Respondents were 
presented with a seven point scale, shaped in the form of a ladder and 
were asked to select where they would place themselves on such a scale 
of socio-economic status (SES). Their self placement scores, which run 
from 1 as the lowest rung to 7 as the highest rung were used to measure 
the SES of each respondent. 
 Formal education has been measured as exposure to formal secular 
/ science education. Those who had religious education were assigned 
the numeral of -1, with no education – illiterate as 0, those who are 
literate as 1, elementary school education as 2, middle school education 
3, regular high school (lise) education as 4, science or Anadolu high 
school education as 5, and university and beyond as 6. Finally, those 
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who have reported that they were members of voluntary associations 
were assigned the numeral value of 1 and those who failed to do so as 0.  
 
V. DETERMINANTS OF THE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TÜRBAN 
 Türban is a relatively new phenomenon, which has started among 
the urban or urbanized women of the Turkish cities, and eventually 
began to be transplanted to the Anatolian hinterland of the country.14 It 
gained political notoriety with its introduction to the Faculty of Theology 
of Ankara University in the late 1960s, though it became a major issue of 
the Turkish college campuses from the 1980s onwards.15 Therefore, there 
are grounds to assume that it is an urban phenomenon. We may 
therefore suspect that the urban attitudes towards it are more favorable, 
while rural orientations are neutral or even apathetic.  
 It has been argued with vehemence by social scientists as well as 
the pundits and journalists that the türban is a modern style,16 which 
provides a shield of modesty for women living in conservative social 
milieu. Thus, by the help of donning the türban women can find safe 
passage out of their homes into the social space of the larger and public 
environment of the major cities of the country. It is therefore, a symbol of 
modernity and participation for women who live in conservative social 
milieu, who are most willing to participate in the larger social life of their 
surroundings. Therefore, the attitudes of women toward the türban are to 
be different then men. Women may not consider it as a religious symbol, 
while men would. In short, we should be able to detect some difference 
                                                
14 For the role of proselytizing and prpoagating for a uniform garb for women see 
Demet Tezcan, Bir Çığır Öyküsü / Şule Yüksel Şenler, (Đstanbul, Turkey: Timaş 
Yayınları, 2007): passim. 
15 For a more thorough analysis of how covering up of the head ears, shoulders, the 
necks of the women students emerged asa apolitical issue in Turkish society see Ali 
Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey, (New 
York, London: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2009 Forthcoming): Chap. 6. 
16 Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey”, 
in Augustus R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, (Leiden and New York: 
1996): 17-43, and Binnaz Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey” in Augustus Richard 
Norton (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East. (Leiden, New York, Koln, E. J. Brill, 1996), 
pp. 87-118. 
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between male and female attitudes toward the türban, if such a variance 
in orientations toward the türban exists. 
 We would also expect long exposure to secular and science 
education would cause the respondents to view türban as a sign of 
religiosity, anti-secular, traditional symbolism, and hence make the 
respondents come into greater agreement with the High Courts of the 
country. Though, it is uncertain as to how formal education influences 
perceptions of wearing the türban as religious discrimination.  
 If türban is a religious symbol, and more specifically a symbol of 
religious right and expression, we should expect to find some covariance 
between religiosity and attitudes toward the türban. However, if it is 
dissociated with traditionalism and religion, and correlated with 
modernity, we should not expect to find much of a relationship between 
religiosity and the türban. 
 Finally, since the very beginning in the 1960s there was 
wholehearted support of the türban wearing women by conservative and 
Islamist student and other socio-political associations. If türban is a 
symbol of an organized Islamist movement we should be able to find 
some covariance between political Islamist orientations as well as 
organizational affiliations and attitudes toward the türban in Turkey. 
 
VI. FINDINGS 
 The two attitudes toward the türban as a legitimacy issue seem to 
be most closely related with our measure of political Islam. Those who 
are just faithfully religious (mütedeyyin or mutekit in Turkish) seem to be 
less inclined to support wearing the türban in state employment and the 
university campuses (see Tables 6 and 7). The more secular formal 
education respondents have the less inclined they are to have a favorable 
attitude toward the legitimacy of the türban (see Tables 6 and 7).  
 There seems to be some evidence indicating that attitudes toward 
the türban as a legitimacy issue resonate favorably in such big cities as 
provincial centers and the small towns of the country, whereas no such 
sentiment can be found in the villages or the metropolitan areas. Türban 
does not seem to be attracting much attitudinal support as a dress code 
in  the  metropolitan  areas  in  Turkey  now.  Although  it   seems   to   be  
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Table 6: STUDENT SHOULD BE FREE TO DON THE TÜRBAN IF SHE 
SO WISHES 
Independent Variables B Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender .111 .323 1.117 
Type of Residence  .000  
Village -.340 .016 .712 
Small Town .405 .054 1.500 
Provincial Center .388 .052 1.473 
Metropolitan -.218 .162 .804 
SES  .113  
SES(1) .179 .725 1.196 
SES (2) -.129 .792 .879 
SES 3) .281 .557 1.324 
SES (4) .316 .505 1.371 
SES (5) .001 .998 1.001 
SES (6) -.071 .892 .931 
Formal Education  .005  
IHL(1) 20.084 .998 527558427.213 
No education(2) .598 .043 1.819 
Elementary(3) .409 .242 1.506 
Middle School(4) .146 .460 1.157 
High School(5) .311 .206 1.365 
Super / Anadolu / 
Private High School(6) 
-.174 .412 .840 
University + (7) -1.061 .012 .346 
Religiosity (Faith) -.162 .004 .851 
Religiosity (Political 
Islam ) 
.392 .000 1.480 
Constant .646 .192 1.909 
Note:  72.2 per cent of the cases correctly estimated. 
Source: Pre – election national survey of 2007 
 
supported as a legitimacy issue in the small towns and the provincial 
centers of the country, it does not seem to attract any support as a 
legitimacy issue in the villages. Gender, SES, and membership in 
organizations do not seem to make any impact on these attitudes (see 
Tables 6 and 7). Women and men, rich and the poor seem to think along 
the same lines on wearing the türban by state employees at work and by 
female students on university campuses.  The major finding so far is  that  
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Table 7: STATE EMPLOYEE SHOULD BE FREE TO DON THE TÜRBAN 
IF SHE SO WISHES    
Independent Variables B Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender .157 .155 1.170 
Type of Residence  .001  
Village -.260 .062 .771 
Small Town .493 .017 1.637 
Provincial Center .373 .054 1.453 
Metropolitan -.084 .590 .920 
SES  .141  
SES(1) -.031 .950 .969 
SES (2) -.235 .632 .791 
SES 3) .186 .698 1.205 
SES (4) .184 .699 1.202 
SES (5) -.134 .782 .874 
SES (6) -.049 .925 .952 
Formal Education  .000  
IHL(1) 1.683 .112 5.382 
No education(2) 1.064 .001 2.897 
Elementary(3) .445 .193 1.560 
Middle School(4) .233 .226 1.262 
High School(5) .282 .237 1.326 
Super / Anadolu / Private High 
School(6) 
-.075 .719 .928 
University + (7) -.872 .037 .418 
Religiosity (Faith) -.179 .001 .836 
Religiosity (Political Islam ) .457 .000 1.579 
Constant .505 .309 1.657 
Note:  71 per cent of the cases correctly estimated. 
Source: Pre – election national survey of 2007. 
 
türban is relatively closely correlated with politics and religion, in larger 
cities, but not the metropolitan centers of the country, and covering up 
matters the most for those inclined towards political Islam and the less 
exposed to formal secular education in Turkey. 
Those who believe that türban is the most important indication of 
religious pressure in Turkey also seem to be coming from the ranks of 
those who are most distinctly inclined toward political Islam. However, 
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the overall impact of formal secular education on the attitudes 
concerning the türban as a symbol of religious pressure or discrimination 
is also consistent with this image, for only those with religious education 
seem to be registering such an attitude. It seems as if although those who 
have been exposed to formal secular education tend to believe that the 
decisions of the High Courts are right, and the high school and 
university educated do not seem to be of the opinion that türban is a sign 
of discrimination. Except for the provincial centers, where most support 
for the turban issue seems to reside, the place of residence of 
respondents, gender, SES, organizational membership or religiosity as 
faith seem not to have any statistically significant impact on the attitudes 
toward the türban as an indication of political pressure.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Attitudes toward the türban constitute a persisting complexity in 
Turkish politics. It is established through our surveys that türban and 
hicab are not considered to be a problem area that requires urgent 
solution in the eyes of the voting age public in Turkey. However, huge 
and increasing majorities tend to think that there should be much more 
tolerance toward the donning of the türban than is legally permissible. 
Large majorities of the Turkish adult public seem to argue that the High 
Court decisions that render türban wearing by state employees and 
university students as unconstitutional are either illegitimate or just 
unacceptable. However, a large majority of the same population do not 
seem to consider that türban-wearing women are under pressure.  
Correspondingly, we have no evidence that the majority of voting age 
adults in Turkey consider the türban issue as one of the most important 
problems of the country. 
 The preceding data analysis unearths that the public attitudes 
toward the türban are mainly determined by religiosity and formal 
education, and to a lesser extent attitudes toward the türban resonate 
well among those voters who reside in the larger city centers of the 
provinces. Those who register opinions toward the türban are neither 
peasants, and nor are they the residents of the metropolitan areas. Türban 
seems to be an issue of the provincial centers and of the small town folks  
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Table 8: TÜRBAN IS A SYMBOL OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
(PRESSURE)  
Independent Variables B Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender -.222 .080 .801 
Type of Residence  .333  
Village .147 .373 1.158 
Small Town .121 .582 1.129 
Provincial Center .421 .033 1.523 
Metropolitan .105 .564 1.110 
SES  .002  
SES(1) .545 .295 1.725 
SES (2) -.433 .404 .649 
SES 3) -.354 .479 .702 
SES (4) -.203 .680 .817 
SES (5) -.454 .371 .635 
SES (6) -.304 .589 .738 
Formal Education  .000  
IHL(1) 1.126 .045 3.082 
No education(2) -
1.456 
.000 .233 
Elementary(3) -.930 .023 .394 
Middle School(4) -.498 .021 .607 
High School(5) -.280 .287 .756 
Super / Anadolu / Private High School(6) -.048 .836 .953 
University + (7) -.924 .149 .397 
Religiosity (Faith) -.052 .397 .950 
Religiosity (Political Islam ) .375 .000 1.455 
Constant -.847 .103 .429 
Note:  81 per cent of the cases correctly estimated. 
Source: Pre – election national survey of 2007. 
 
in Turkey. The single most important variable that contributes to 
favorable attitudes toward the türban is a form of religiosity, which I 
have called political Islam in this paper (see Tables 6 – 8). Political 
Islamism, which also includes demands for the establishment of rule 
according to Sharia (Şer´i) law in Turkey, seems to be singularly related 
to all types of attitudes toward the türban. Traditional religiosity plays a 
humble role relative to political Islamism, and formal education in 
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secular institutions also seems to curb such a favorable or relaxed 
attitude toward the türban in Turkey.  
Political Islam also seems to function as the source of thinking that 
the actions to curb the türban are a form of pressure or discrimination 
against the female believers. Formal education seems to have a similar 
negative impact on that form of thinking as well.  Those with some 
religious education seem to be most inclined to suggest that the türban 
donning women are discriminated against. It also seems as if similar 
türban related attitudes are more prevalent among the provincial city 
centers of the country. In sum, political Islamic value orientation of the 
individual voters seems to emerge as the primary source that determines 
attitudes toward the türban issue. 
The findings of this paper, seem to coincide with the earlier 
findings that use similar data and statistical tests17 that attitudes toward 
the türban issue in Turkey are deeply influenced by religiosity, and most 
specifically about Şer’i rule and related Islamism. However, religiosity is 
not the only source that fully explains those attitudes although it seems 
to be their most important or primary source or determinant.  Formal 
education also seems to play some role though it is not comparable with 
religiosity, and residence in larger cities also seem to create a favorable 
attitude toward türban donning in state employment and university 
campuses. 
We have not been able to find any empirical evidence that the 
attitudes toward the türban differ across different levels of SES. Türban 
emerged as an attire of the urban or urbanizing women in the 1960s and 
gained more notoriety since the 1980s. In fact, the attitudes toward it 
seem to be most favorable among the inhabitants not of the metropolitan 
areas but of the bigger cities of the country.  Civic activism, in the form 
of membership in voluntary associations fails to influence the attitudes 
of the voters toward the türban in Turkey one way or the other. Men and 
women seem to be predisposed equally for or against the türban. This 
does not support the claim that men and women hold different attitudes 
                                                
17 Ersin Kalaycioglu, “The Mystery of the Türban: Participation or Revolt?” Turkish 
Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2005): pp. 233-251. 
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toward the türban, whereby women’s attitudes are more instrumental to 
the issue than those of the more religious, ideological or conservative 
men.  
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APPENDIX 
The Study’s Survey Sample 
The data for this study are collected in a national field survey of 
voter attitudes, values, beliefs, orientations, and reported behavior 
concerning party preferences during the July 22, 2007 general elections in 
Turkey. Our sampling procedure took target sample size as 2000. First, 
Turkish Statistical Institute’s (Türkiye Đstatistik Kurumu-TUIK) NUT-1 
regions are adopted and the target sample was distributed according to 
each region’s share of urban and rural population according to registered 
voter records for 2002 election. We used TUIK’s block data and decided 
to take the 200 blocks of equal size. We targeted to reach 10 voters from 
each block. We applied probability proportionate to population size 
(PPS) principle in selecting neighborhood and villages from each TUIK-1 
region of urban and rural localities. All neighborhoods and villages are 
separated into NUT-1 regions and PPS selection was applied to select 
neighborhoods and villages.  
For every one of these blocks we also picked a randomly selected 
replacement in accordance with PPPS for cases where the 10 planned 
interviews could not be completed in the primary selected neighborhood 
or village. From each of these neighborhoods block addresses are 
obtained from TUIK. 10 addresses from each neighborhood were given 
to the fieldworkers and all addresses were asked to be reached. When 10 
interviews could not be completed after two visits to each address the 
remaining interviews were completed from the replacement block via 
the same procedure. In rural areas the selected villages were visited and 
addresses were obtained from the village headman (muhtar). If 10 
interviews from a village cannot be completed its replacement village 
was visited and the same procedure was applied. In selecting the 
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individual to be interviewed from each household an alphabetical list of 
all residents above the age of 18 was first formed. Then the 
alphabetically first name was selected for interview. If this individual 
was not available for interview in the household a second individual in 
the same alphabetical order was selected for interview. Individuals who 
were replacements of the first selection were noted in the dataset for tests 
of significant difference.  
In order to take account of cancellations after the fieldwork 
controls at least two interviews were conducted from the replacement 
lists from each urban block and village. The surveys were conducted in 
the month before the general elections, in the heat of the election 
campaign period, when voter interest in political parties, candidates and 
political issues of the day was at a peak. A total of 2018 prospective 
voters were interviewed at their households, and the resulting sampling 
error was plus/minus 2.3%.  
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